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I. INTRODUCTION
A legal savant has been quoted as saying that the lawyer
obtains as much precise direction from his guide to professional
responsibility as a heart surgeon could usefully derive from exam-
ination of a valentine.' It is not quite as bad as that - but almost.
The point has been made many times that the lawyers' Code of
Professional Responsibility2 does not suffer from overprecision.3
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. A.B., University of Notre
Dame, 1959; J.D., University of Texas, 1962. Patrice Halbach, 1980 candidate for the J.D.
Degree at the University of Minnesota, rendered valuable research assistance. Work on
this article was assisted by a grant from the Goodrich Professional Responsibility Fund
at the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Letter from Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam to the Grievance Committee of the
District of Columbia, quoted in Time, May 13, 196, at 81.
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODEI.
3. See, e.g., Levy, Time to Review the Code, 62 A.B.A.J. 225 (1976); Wolfram, Client
1
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Whether the matter be an emerging controversial issue such as
the duty of corporate counsel to inform a client's outside auditors
of the existence of possible contingent liabilities' or an ancient
debate over the responsibilities of an attorney when confronted
with the opportunity to score an advantage in litigation by advis-
ing a cooperative witness of the relevant legal background against
which needed testimony might be modeled, s on too many such
issues the Code that purports to regulate the professional lives
of lawyers is either altogether silent or very opaque. Pressures
are mounting for a thorough reconsideration and redrafting of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.'
Of what value then could the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility be in extracting meaning from the reasonable person stan-
dard in legal malpractice and other similar types of private party
litigation in which an attorney's duties are in issue? Help, if
available from the Code, would be extremely useful, for the rea-
sonable person norm itself is a largely indeterminate standard
that must depend for meaning on a case-by-case process of judi-
cial and jury elaboration in the absence of any more generalized
and authoritative guidance. It will be seen that to date the Code
has actually not served as a very important source of assistance
Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 870 (1977); Barnett, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REv. 648,
651 n.13 (1977). Courts have generally rejected void-for-vagueness constitutional attacks
on the Code, holding that despite its generality it is sufficiently definite for the purposes
of disciplining members of a specialized profession. See, e.g., In re Keiler, 80 A.2d 119
(D.C. 1977); In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976). But cf. Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (Discipli-
nary Rules of ABA CODE pertaining to lawyer comments on pending litigation unconstitu-
tional in part on void-for-vagueness grounds).
4. ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for
Information, 32 Bus. LAW. 177 (1976); Hinsey, Auditors' Inquiries and Lawyers'
Responses, 62 A.B.A.J. 1572 (1976); Opinion and Comment: Responses to Auditors'
Requests, 62 A.B.A.J. 493 (1976); Note, Attorney Responses to Audit Letters: The Prob-
lem of Disclosing Loss Contingencies Arising from Litigation and Unasserted Claims, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 838 (1976).
5. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 59-77 (1975);
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MiCH. L. REV.
1485, 1488 (1966). Compare Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal De-
fense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1478-80 (1966).
6. Partly in response to criticism concerning its vagueness, a special committee of
the American Bar Association has recently been appointed to consider changes to the ABA
Code. See Committee on Evaluation of Professional Standards Seeks Advice and Counsel
of Members, 64 A.B.A.J. 143 (1978). For comments by some of the more outspoken critics
of the Code as presently drafted, see J. LIEBERMAN, CmsIs AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL
ETHICS AND WHAT TO DO ABOT IT (1978); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
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to courts in private litigation. In part this is attributable to the
lack of clarity in the Code itself. But, as will be demonstrated,
several provisions of the existing Code could be made to yield
much more helpful guidance than courts thus far have seemed
willing to admit. Particularly if current moves to redraft the Code
result in a substantially more specific document, the principle
that attorney violations of the Code may serve as some indication
of entitlement to damages or other private suit relief may become
of truly widespread significance.
This essay will first examine the question of the legitimacy
of employing provisions of the Code as the measure of a lawyer's
responsibilities in tort, contract, and similar litigation. It will
then attempt, illustratively but not exhaustively, to identify pro-
visions of the Code that may be of potential utility in private
party litigation against, or by, attorneys. The examples chosen
have emerged serendipituously from an avid reading of advance
sheets dealing with emerging problems of professional responsi-
bility. The focus will be primarily on theories of recovery in legal
malpractice actions against attorneys by former clients and third
parties, including actions based both on negligence and inten-
tional act theories of recovery. This illustrative catalogue of theo-
ries also looks at conflicts of interest, business dealings with a
client, client confidences and secrets, communication with an
adverse party, frivolous litigation, attorneys' fees, and fee split-
ting.
IL. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Before proceeding, a brief discussion of the substance and
structure of the regulatory norms that will be examined in this
article may be useful. Provisions known in every state but Califor-
nia as the "Code of Professional Responsibility" (the Code) have
been authoritatively adopted as rules to govern the professional
lives of lawyers,' and California's "Rules of Professional Con-
duct" are modeled at many important points upon the Code., The
text of the Code was generated by the American Bar Association
in 1969 and traces its ancestry to the ABA Canons of Ethics, first
adopted in 1908. The 1908 Canons were very general in their
statement and seem not have been employed to any significant
7. See Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MNN. L. Rv. 619, 632 nn. 51 & 52 (1978).
8. Id. at n.52.
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extent in private litigation.9 The 1969 Code is an improvement on
the older Canons but, as mentioned,'" has apparently failed to
satisfy the demand for clearly stated rules on many important
regulatory questions confronting members of the legal profession.
The Code is composed of three types of stated standards. At
the greatest level of generality are nine Canons that are defined
in the Code itself as "axiomatic norms."" The Canons are very
vague - for example, "A lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety."' 2 They have understandably-
not figured prominently even in attorney discipline cases, and in
the Code they serve as little more than titles to chapters. The
much more extensive Ethical Considerations of the Code are
"aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive."'" As such,
they serve the largely heuristic function of giving moral advice to
attorneys about preferred but not mandatory behavior. Only the
Disciplinary Rules are "mandatory in character" in the sense that
any violation of them may lead to disciplinary action." The Disci-
plinary Rules (DRs) cover the familiar terrain of advertising and
solicitation - "the petty details of form and manners," which in
1934 Mr. Justice Stone found to be the main burden of the older
Canons of Ethics. '5 Also covered are such subjects as client con-
fidences and secrets, conflicts of interest, competent representa-
tion, and the matters of zeal and restraint in the representation
of a client.
In most jurisdictions the Code has been authoritatively pro-
mulgated by state action - normally court action, but in isolated
instances through legislative enactment" - as the binding rules
of conduct for attorneys. In a few states the Code has been
adopted by action of the state bar associations with implicit or
explicit judicial affirmation of its binding effect."' The constraints
9. See Rottman & Stern, The Risk of Attorney Professional Liability, 28 J. Mo. B.
127, 127-28 (1972).
10. See text at notes 1-6 supra.
1i. See Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE.
12. ABA CODE, CANON 9.
13. Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE.
14. Id.
15. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1934).
16. See authorities cited in Wolfram, supra note 7, at 632 nn. 51 & 52 (1978). In most
jurisdictions the Code has been adopted by court order or legislation. In a few, its adoption
has taken the form of bar association approval. See Report of the Special Committee to
Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 268 (1972).
17. A notable example is California where, in addition to the adoption of Rules of
[Vol. 30
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of the Code are enforced in every jurisdiction through official
attorney disciplinary agencies. 8 Ultimate authority to pass upon
violations and sanctions is vested in the appellate courts of the
jurisdiction. 9
The picture that emerges from examination of the Code and
its present level of enforcement in most states is that in several
areas of practice a lawyer is not free to choose a personal course
of conduct without risk. 0 For these areas, Code rules explicitly
provide for the sanction of professional discipline if violated.
Some courts nonetheless insist that at least some violations of the
Code by attorneys are to be dealt with exclusively through the
sanction of professional discipline; a violation of the Code cannot
be relied upon as the basis for a civil recovery by a person injured
as a result of the violation. 2' But if violation of the Code could
lead to discipline of the offending attorney, what reason can be
given for refusing to hold the same attorney to the same standard
in a private civil action for recovery of damages? The conclusions
that should be reached are that the justifications for the broad-
ened use of the Code in such private litigation are strong and that
the objections to this use are not sufficiently weighty to cause
rejection of the common-sense notion that the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility should serve as a measure both of profes-
sional discipline and of civil liability sanctions.
Professional Conduct for lawyers by the State's Supreme Court, see 14 Cal. 3d 1 (1975),
many local California bar associations have adopted the ABA's Code as part of their
bylaws, E.g., Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR AssoCIATON BYLAws art. 13 (1976); SAN DIEGO
CouNTY BAR AssoClTION AMENDED BYLAws art. 14 (1976). California courts have freely
referred to the ABA Code for authoritative guidance. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v.
Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 871, 558 P.2d 545, 551, 135 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (1977). An example
of another model is Maine, where the Code is adopted, amended, and enforced through
agencies of the Maine State Bar Association, a nonintegrated bar. But the Maine court
has held that all Maine attorneys are bound to follow the ABA Code, which will be
followed by the Maine courts "as a source of guidance in disciplinary matters." In re
Dineen, 380 A.2d 603, 604 (Me. 1977).
18. See generally ABA JoINT COMMrrrEE ON PROFESSIONAL DIsCIPLINE STANDARDS FOR
LAWYER DisciPLINARY AND DisABmrrY PROCEEDINGS (Tent. Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as
ABA DISCIPLINE STANDARDS]. The standards were endorsed at the February 1979 meeting
of the ABA. See 47 U.S.L.W. 2524 (1979).
19. Id. at 4-5. See also text accompanying note 33 infra.
20. Since the Code's adoption in the early 1970's there has been an intensification of
lawyer disciplinary agency activity, as measured by such things as the number of reported
disbarments. See, Lawscope: Tighter Discipline Shown by Statistics, 63 A.B.A.J. 24
(1977) (76% increase between 1973 and 1975 in number of disbarments and even higher
rate of increase in suspensions and public reprimands). It remains to be seen whether
the increased enforcement continues well beyond such concommitant spurs to attorney
discipline as those generated by the Watergate crisis.
21. See, e.g., authorities cited and discussed at note 124 and accompanying text infra.
19791
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III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXPANSIVE USE OF THE CODE IN PRIVATE
LITIGATION
The affirmative case for increased judicial resort to the Code
of Professional Responsibility as a source of the legal norms to be
applied to attorneys in private civil litigation is basically com-
posed of analogies to similar areas of the law in which normally
extraneous source materials are now readily accepted by courts
as premises for judicial reasoning. The first analogy is to the
courts' uses of criminal statutes and similar enactments as au-
thoritative guides in damage litigation. The second is to accept-
ance of custom or work practices as an appropriate measure of the
liability of actors subject in the extra-judicial world to the work-
ings of those customs or practices.
In civil suits, courts everywhere now receive as evidence of
the violator's failure to employ due care proof of a violation of a
criminal statute if the injured party is within the statute's in-
tended area of protection.22 Indeed, many jurisdictions treat the
statutory violations as producing liability per se.? In the end the
rationale for looking to a criminal statute as a definition of the
civil law responsibilities of an alleged offender rests on the view
that the fundamental policy choices reflected in the statute
should also be relied upon by courts in assessing the alleged of-
fender's liability for damages or other civil relief.24 In the courts'
role as the cooperative effectuators of legislative policy and in the
exercise of their common-law power to define the occasions on
which civil liability will be imposed even though not explicitly
created by legislation, the courts may appropriately create a right
of action for private relief to advance the policy objectives of the
legislation - at least when doing so will neither unwisely deter
the range of choice that should be available to citizens2 nor bring
22. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Novick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1960);
Gard v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Franco v. Bunyard, 547 S.W.2d
91 (Ark.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Perry v. Medeiros, 343 N.W.2d 859 (Mass.
1976).
23. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Schroeder, 116 Ariz. 104, 568 P.2d 411 (1977); Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (Cardozo, J.); Shearer v. DeShon, 240 S.C 472,
126 SE.2d 514 (1962); White v. Gore, 201 Va. 239, 110 S.E.2d 228 (1959); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 288B(1) (1965).
24. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTs § 17.6 (1st ed. 1956); R. KEETON,
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 94 (1969); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv. 453 (1933); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV.
L. REv. 317, 322 (1913).
25. See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp.,
566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations
286 [Vol. 30
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss2/6
CiviL LITIGATION
in its wake other evils that may counsel leaving effectuation of
the policy to the only remedies that have been explicitly recog-
nized in the statute.26 In modem times, of course, the same ra-
tionale has been employed by courts on numerous occasions to
create private rights of action under other than criminal statutes.
Common modern illustrations of this expansive treatment are
cases in which statutory or administrative regulations of busi-
nesses or other groups or of activities such as operating a motor
vehicle are employed to create or define rights of action for re-
covery of damages in behalf of persons for whose benefit the regu-
lations were formulated.
A similar rationale should lead courts in future cases to em-
ploy the Code of Professional Responsibility more creatively and
expansively to define the civil liability of lawyers. Just as with
legislative enactment of criminal statutes, business regulations,
or safe driving requirements, promulgation of the Code within a
state is meant to affect the conduct of persons subject to its
terms. And as with criminal and similar sanctions, the discipli-
nary sanctions for violations of the Code (disbarment, suspen-
sion, or reprimand) are occasionally very drastic punishment.
But, both to complement the Code's deterrent aims and to make
whole persons who suffer harm because of attorney violations of
it, testing an attorney's civil liability by resort to the Code is both
fair and appropriate.
To be sure, the Code itself states that it does not "undertake
to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional
conduct," but this should be read as Code neutrality, not hostil-
ity. Nothing in the Code suggests it would be inappropriate for a
court to examine the Code as a possible source of guidance in a
civil case. Surely the class of persons who would be disadvantaged
in private litigation by imposition of Code duties - lawyers -
cannot claim that the Code has been drafted without sufficient
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 483 (6th Cir. 1977); Drake v. Detroit
Edison Co., 443 F. Supp. 833, 837 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
26. Objections to the proposed expanded use of the Code as a source of private right
are considered, infra at 295-303.
27. Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympa-
thetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978); see, e.g., Franco v. Bunyard, 547 S.W.2d 91 (Ark.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977) (violation of Federal Gun Control Act by legitimate gun
dealer who sold pistol to escaped convict gives rise to right of action arising out of foreseea-
ble harm done by convict through use of pistol).
28. James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REy. 95
(1950); 7 AM. JuR. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §§ 364-68 (1963).
29. Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE. ,
1979]
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consideration of its interests. Attorneys, through the organized
bar, have played a very dominant role in the development of the
Code.'" Thus, there should be no concern that the Code has been
shaped with insufficient regard for their special needs and con-
cerns and foisted upon lawyers.
Similarly, the occasional reluctance of courts to employ
criminal or similar statutes as measures of civil liability because
of a belief that the legislative silence on the subject of civil reme-
dies should be regarded as legislative hostility to them3' is simply
not relevant in the context of the Code. The courts of every juris-
diction have ultimate responsibility for shaping the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. In most jurisdictions the Code is not
effective unless adopted by the highest court of the jurisdiction.3 1
The courts also play a relatively unrestrained role in interpreting
the Code in attorney discipline and similar types of litigation.
Indeed, the great majority of courts today would probably take
the position under the "inherent powers" doctrine 33 that it is
beyond the legislative competence, and solely within that of the
judicial branch, to modify the Code. Thus, the Code is within the
peculiar care and custody of the courts in ways that enactments
of the state legislature are not. Judicial initiative in enlarging
attorney liability to bring it into agreement with the dictates of
the Code, then, can in no manner be thought an illegitimate
usurpation of legislative prerogatives.
Moreover, judicial expansion of recoveries for professional
civil liability may be necessary to achieve an acceptable level of
attorney compliance with the Code. There seems to be abroad in
much of the land a new sense of impatience with incompetent
attorneys and with the historic failure of courts, the organized
bar, legal education institutions, and other agencies to deal effec-
tively with a perceived problem of incompetent 3 and unethica
3 5
30. See generally Wolfram, supra note,7, at 634-35 (1978).
31. See generally, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78.(1975); Redington v. Touche Ross
& Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,404 (2d Cir. April 21, 1978),
cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 563 (1978).
32. See Wolfram, supra note 7, at 636-40.
33. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 41-42 (1953); L. PATrERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE
PIRFESSION OF LAw 33-36 (1971); Wolfram, supra note 7, at 636-41; Note, The Inherent
Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law - A Proposed Delineation, 60
MINN. L. REv. 783 (1976); Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers. 7
UTAH L. REv. 82 (1960); Comment, Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the Bar?,
47 J. UnB. L. 715 (1969).
34. It has become almost an article of faith for many contemporary reformers of the
legal profession that there is widespread incompetence among attorneys. But a commenta-
tor whose own credentials as a reformer of the legal profession are entirely in order has
[Vol. 30
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss2/6
19791 CIVIL LITIGATION 289
legal representation. The bar particularly, with some exceptions,
has been said to have done little to ensure a higher level of attor-
ney competence.3 Evidently, many courts now share this impati-
ence - at least if the present rate of increase in legal malpractice
recoveries is any indication of judicial sentiment. The increasing
incidence of recoveries against attorneys for legal malpractice
may now be fairly said to be taking on the proportions of a legal
revolution. From the very occasional case of some decades ago,
most often concerning flagrant carelessness in a clear recovery
case, the category of recoverable claims for legal malpractice in
recent years has been expanded by courts to include both new
theories of liability" and new plaintiffs. 3 Despite some localized
evidence of persisting judicial hostility, 9 judges generally have
recently suggested that the problem of attorney incompetence has been seriously exagger-
ated. Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. Rv.
613 (1977).
35. E.g., A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL (1977); Auerbach, The Legal Profession After
Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1287 (1976); N.Y. Times, May 5, 1978, at 1, col. 5 (report
of President Carter's speech to the Los Angeles Bar Association).
36. E.g., Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REv. 434, 451 (1975).
37. Very significant among the new theories in several jdrisdictions has been the
extension to legal malpractice cases of the "discovery" rule for tolling the statute of
limitations. See Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J.
689, 690 (1977). The leading case is Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1969).
Suggestions for a heightened standard of care for legal specialists are also of great
potential significance. E.g., Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194
(1975) (admiralty lawyer); Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will
New Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the
Specialist?, 45 CIN. L. REv. 541 (1976); Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43
IND. L.J. 771, 785-89 (1968); Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 ANI.
U.L. REV. 408, 411-14 (1977).
38. A pair of California cases has breached the "privity" wall to recovery by nonclient
third parties against a negligent attorney. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (recovery against attorney by
intended beneficiaries of will that failed because of attorney's negligence); Biakanja v.
Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (notary acting as attorney in drafting defective
will liable to intended beneficiary who did not take by intestacy).
39. Some opinions suggest a plain judicial refusal to believe that an attorney-
defendant would have done anything as unprofessional as what was charged by the plain-
tiff. E.g., Ziegler v. Cray, 148 Minn. 447, 182 N.W. 616 (1921) (client's testimony that his
attorney had advised him erroneously on a matter of bankruptcy law did not foreclose
directed verdict against client; the plaintiff's testimony was inherently unbelievable
because "such is not the law and defendant has been too long at the bar and in active
practice not to be perfectly familiar with the point . . . ."). Of the same ilk are some of
the cases in which attorneys are protected by courts against client claims on the rationale
that the attorney was at most guilty of a "mere error of judgment." Under this white-
heart-but-empty-head doctrine, a "mere innocent error" by the attorney will not consti-
tute negligence so long as the attorney has acted in good faith and with the client's best
9
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apparently begun to shed past reluctance to visit the financial
burdens of expanded malpractice liability upon brother or sister
laviyers 0 and their legal malpractice insurance carriers."
It seems certain that reliance upon the attorney disciplinary
process alone will not achieve adequate levels of attorney compe-
tence and ethical behavior. When one looks specifically at attor-
ney incompetence, while discipline of the negligent attorney
seems clearly called for under the text of the Code, 2 convincing
evidence exists that some lawyer disciplinary agencies as a matter
of policy are avoiding cases that concern a single instance of
carelessness.43 The reasons for this are endemic and irradicable in
interests as the objective. Perhaps the leading case is In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1 (1903).
Among the scattering of recent cases, see, e.g., Allred v. Rabon, 572 P.2d 979, 981 (Okla.
1977).
40. E.g., Schnidman & Selzer, supra note 37; Comment, New Developments in Legal
Malpractice, supra note 37. Others besides doctors have noticed the disparity of treatment
that medical and legal defendants traditionally have received at the hands of courts. E.g.,
Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 NoTRE DAME LAw. 888
(1973).
41. Huteheson, Lawyers, How Is Your Malpractice?, 30 INS. CouNsEL J. 423 (1963);
Lawscope: Legal Malpractice Expert Sees Roller-Coaster Future, 64 A.B.A.J. 325 (1978);
Levit, The Legal Malpractice Crisis, [1977] INs. L.J. 609; Hill, The Bar at Bay: Malprac-
tice Woes Hit Attorneys as Lawsuits Against Them Increase, Wall St. J., February 3, 1976,
at 1, col. 1.
42. ABA CODE, DISCIPLINARY RULE [hereinafter cited as DR] 6-101(A):
A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not com-
petent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to
handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Some jurisdictions have rejected the wording of DR 6-101 and permit much more
careless or persistent conduct before an attorney is subject to discipline. See, e.g., CAL.
R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6-101 (attorney carelessness proscribed only if committed
"wilfully or habitually" and "good faith" of attorney is always to be considered); Hoppe
v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (1978) (New Jersey version of DR 6-101
proscribes only "gross negligence" or "pattern" of negligence in handling legal matters).
43. See, e.g., Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 226 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1976);
State v. Soderberg, 215 Wis. 571, 255 N.W. 906 (1934); Mutnick, The Nexus Between
Professional Discipline and Legal Malpractice, 2 BRIEF/CAsE 8 (Summer 1976); Note,
Negligence or Incompetence of an Attorney as Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension,
30 NOa DAM LAw. 273, 275-76, 283 (1955). Occasional examples of discipline for single
instances of incompetence exist, e.g., In re Crane, 400 Mich. 484, 255 N.W.2d 624 (1977),
but almost always there is some aggravating circumstance, see, e.g., In re Grinchis, 75 N.J.
495, 384 A.2d 137 (1978) (severe reprimand for single instance of malpractice when attor-
ney had failed to communicate with client or successor counsel over long period of time).
This policy of restraint might be grounded in the notion that it would be inappro-
priate for the agency to become involved in a matter that might be the subject of civil
litigation. Fears of possible res judicata implications of agency action may be one concern.
See text accompanying notes 69.78 infra. Or it may be considered unduly burdensome for
the attorney to be required to defend before two different tribunals for the same alleged
10
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the disciplinary process. As presently constituted the process
struggles against serious and perhaps inescapable structural limi-
tations in its effort to control incompetent and otherwise unethi-
cal attorneys. Among other problems, disciplinary agencies are
typically understaffed, underfinanced, and too often so domi-
nated by the group they regulate that they are incapable of signif-
icantly expanding disciplinary control."
Because of the different institutional and economic settings
in which legal malpractice and similar civil liability adjudica-
tions occur, however, the adversarial forum offers the prospect of
a significant increase in deterrence of attorney wrongdoing that
is also tortious or otherwise civilly actionable. Spurred by the
outrage of injury and the need for compensation, the person di-
rectly injured by an attorney violation can be expected to respond
more readily with a damage action than the attorney disciplinary
agency can with effective enforcement proceedings. The contin-
gent fee often provides adequate economic incentives to see the
civil litigation through, 5 so that staffing" and financing present
offense. See note 75 infra. Also, it may be felt that the pendency of the civil litigation
(whatever its outcome) will supply some measure of deterrence to future acts of malprac-
tice. Or, client complaints may be viewed as unimportant. Cf., e.g., Foot v. Hughes, 92
Mont. 53, 10 P.2d 584 (1932) (attorney should not be required in bar discipline case to
turn over funds wrongfully withheld from client because this would make the court a
collection agency).
While some of these notions have appeal, they in no way support a general policy of
refusing to proceed in any single-instance legal malpractice case. They also, of course, do
not support a refusal to proceed when a malpractice case, although a theoretical possibil-
ity, is not pending and is not likely.
44. On the staffing and budgetary problems of lawyer disciplinary agencies, see ABA
SPECIAL CowMrrrEN ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970). On the matter of lawyer dominance of
lawyer disciplinary agencies, see Wolfram, supra note 7, at 630, 634, 641-42.
45. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SEVICES 5 (1964); L. PATTERSON
& E. CHEATHAM, supra note 33, at 274; Corboy, Contingent Fees: The Individuals Key to
the Courthouse Door, LITIGATION, Summer 1976, at 27; cf. Clermont & Currivan,
Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. Rav. 529 (1978) (contingent fee as
presently employed may in some instances provide opposite incentives).
46. Until relatively recently, in most communities there were probably strong infor-
mal pressures against acceptance of a legal malpractice claim by a claimant's attorney.
See. e.g., Drinker, Canons 28 and 29 - An Appraisal, 12 VAND. L. REV. 779, 781 (1959);
ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 144 (1935) (there should be
no custom of attorneys refusing to testify or proceed against other attorneys for malprac-
tice or misconduct).
Specialization in legal malpractice work now seems to be emerging as an acceptable
function within the legal community, see TIME, Jan. 12, 1976, at 53; Wall St. J., February
3, 1976, at 1, col. 1, although perhaps the situation is unchanged in small communities
remote from large pools of lawyers, cf. R. MALLEN V. V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 179
(1977) (extreme reluctance among local practitioners in small communities to testify
against fellow attorney in malpractice litigation).
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less of a problem. In comparison with the difficult burden of proof
that customarily confronts the prosecutor in an attorney discipli-
nary proceeding," a more favorable burden of proof will favor the
claimant against an attorney in a civil suit. In addition, a jury of
nonlawyers determines the question of liability in the civil suit,
48
whereas in a disciplinary proceeding lawyers, who are also the
professional colleagues of the accused attorney, compose all or
most" of the panel confronted.0 The resulting liberalization and
increase in damage awards will itself supply a significant measure
of deterrence and create incentives for improved office manage-
ment and increased attention to governing standards such as the
Code of Professional Responsibility.-" In addition, the indirect
regulatory efforts of legal malpractice insurers will create their
own pressures on attorneys to adopt procedures and heed norms
that will tend to keep them free from personal civil litigation.52
Means such as these will produce a vehicle for discipline free of
many of the constraints that have hobbled the efforts of attorney
disciplinary agencies. This judicial enhancement of the civil lia-
bility sanction through a greater readiness to impose liability for
47. While the typical civil suit burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence,
in attorney disciplinary proceedings the widely employed burden of proof is the stricter
"clear and convincing evidence" standard. See ABA DIscIPLINE STANDARDS, supra note 18,
at 65; ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 15 n.12 (1975). A few states, however, employ the more easily
satisfied "preponderance of the evidence" standard in attorney discipline cases. See, e.g.,
In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1978); In re Crane, 400 Mich. 484, 255 N.W.2d 624
(1977).
48. In some jurisdictions, see note 39 supra, judges may go to unusual lengths in legal
malpractice cases to protect brother or sister lawyers against liability, but this attitude
seems to be waning. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
49. Several jurisdictions have recently supplemented the previously all-lawyer mem-
bership of attorney disciplinary agencies with a minority of nonlawyer members. Wolfram,
supra note 7, at 642 n.89.
50. As with the related problem of an historic unwillingness of attorneys to sue one
another in legal malpractice cases, see note 46 supra, lawyers' collegial instincts probably
make many lawyer-members of disciplinary agencies reluctant to find Code violations, see
note 74 infra. The transgressions of lawyers in marginal areas of law practice are, according
to some observers, pursued more vigorously. E.g., J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' EThIcs: A SURvEY
OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 165-77 (1966); Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The
Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 244, 255-56 (1968).
51. E.g., Mutnick, The Nexus Between Professional Discipline and Legal
Malpractice, 2 BRIEF/CASE 8 (Summer 1976); Steinberg, The Disciplinary Rules and Com-
petence of Counsel: A Proposed Alternative, 11 GONZAGA L. REv. 133 (1975).
52. Legal malpractice insurers, as a loss prevention measure, may insist on the main-
tenance of bookkeeping and calendaring in an insured law office as a condition to the
malpractice liability insurance protection. See Pfeffer, Lawyers' Legal Liability
Insurance, 16 JuDGES' JoURNAL 27, 32 (1977).
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss2/6
1979] CIVIL LITIGATION
Code violations may thus deter future acts of legal malpractice
and other types of serious attorney wrongdoing that are not now
effectively controlled.
The second general argument in favor of increased resort to
the Code for a definition of a lawyer's civil responsibilities is the
analogy to the doctrine that custom or work practices may be
used in negligence litigation to define the relevant standard of
care. This is best illustrated in the context of a legal malpractice
action against an attorney, but a similar analysis may support the
use of the Code as custom or work practice in other areas such as
contract litigation over legal fees 3 or tort litigation not involving
negligence. 4 The customary judicial description in legal malprac-
tice cases of an attorney's duty of care starts with the assertion
that the attorney owes the client the duty to exercise "ordinary
care" in handling the client's work.5 This standard is said to
obligate the attorney to use the knowledge, skill, and ability ordi-
narily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession
in similar circumstances." Normally the meaning of the legal
53. See, e.g., ABA CODE, ETHIcAL CONSIDERATION [hereinafter cited as ECI 2-18
("Commendable and long-standing tradition of the bar" that "special consideration" be
given in the setting of a fee for another lawyer or a member of the family of another
lawyer); EC 2-19 (it is "usually beneficial" to reduce terms of the attorney-client contract
to writing, particularly when the fee is to be contingent). Presumably the more forceful
argument for the relevance of a Disciplinary Rule in contract litigation would be on the
basis of "legality" rather than mere custom. Accordingly, only Ethical Considerations
(because of their nonbinding, hortatory nature, see text accompanying note 13 supra)
would often be introduced into contract litigation as custom. On the general question of
the relevance of custom to contract issues, see 3 A. CoRniN, CoNmAcTs §§ 556-57 (2d ed.
1960).
54. E.g., Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1195 (Pa.
1978) (Code prohibition against in-person solicitation is significant in evaluating whether
ex-associate's contacts with former firm's clients constituted "improper" interference with
existing contractual relationship under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (Tent.
Draft No. 23, 1977)).
55. E.g., Leighton v. New York S. & W.R.R., 303 F. Supp. 599, (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975); Wade v. Arnold,
52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958). The norm, however, is not the "average" lawyer
because, presumably, if the standard were taken literally it would render incompetent the
half of the number of practicing lawyers who are less competent than the average lawyer.
Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975). There is obviously little
specific assistance in the "ordinary care" standard, and it has been criticized for its
inability to assist courts in. the resolution of individual cases. E.g., R. MALEN v. V. LEVIT,
supra note 46, at 164 (1977); Heffernan, Professional Malpractice Insurance: Let the
Attorney Beware, 48 CONN. B.J. 347, 348 (1975).
56. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879); Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.
3d 349, 356, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 625 (1975); Kurtenbach v. TeKippe,
260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-
46 (1954). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 299A (1965); W. PROSSER,
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malpractice standard of care in any individual case can be deter-
mined by the factfinder only with the assistance of expert testi-
moiy that describes the standard of care that is ordinarily exer-
cised by other attorneys. 7
This habitual deference to the testimony of lawyers as expert
witnesses to define the standard of care for other lawyers reflects
a pervasive and enduring theme in tort law. Tort standards of
care generally attempt to measure the conduct of a defendant by
reference to the common practices of the members of the com-
munity in which the defendant has habitually functioned. Con-
siderations of fairness, a judicial desire to further efficiency by
encouraging adherence to readily observable standards, and an
instinct to defer to the demonstrated general proclivities of the
group have uniformly persuaded courts to admit evidence of
custom and habit as bearing on the question of due care. It
would be fully within this tradition of deference for courts to rely
upon provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, or to
have members of juries do so, when the question of an attorney's
competence is raised.
Very rarely, if ever, will the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity serve as an adequate substitute for all expert testimony in a
legal malpractice case. Because of its imprecision, the present
Code would often be open to differing interpretations (which,
presumably, would be the subject of expert professional testi-
mony). For example, the prohibitions in DR 5-105(A) against
accepting a client if the matter will result in an impairment of
the lawyer's "independent professional judgment" or "in [his]
representing differing interests" are simply too indeterminate to
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 932 at 164 (4th ed. 1971); Wade, The Attorney's Liability
for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 762-65 (1959).
57. See, e.g., Dorf v. RelIes, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark.
72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977);
Sanders v. Smith, 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102 (1972). The normal requirement of expert
testimony may be dispensed with in instances in which the attorney's failure is so palpable
that a jury can adequately determine lack of conformance to the "ordinary practitioner"
standard with the use of only common knowledge and lay comprehension of legal matters.
EZg., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Keown, 451 F. Supp. 397, 402 (D.N.J. 1978); Butts v.
Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Ky. 1956); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 252 N.W.2d 107, 116
(Minn. 1977).
58. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 24, § 17.3 at 977; 2 J. WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 461 (3d
ed. 1940); James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials,
5 VANm L. REV. 697, 709-10 (1952); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLuM. L. REV.
1147 (1942). For cases dealing with the work rules of defendant employers, see generally 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 981; C. MORRIS, Toms 119-20 (1956).
[Vol. 30
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serve as useful guides to a lay factfinder in any but the most
blatant cases unless accompanied by clarifying expert testimony.
Yet, as courts thrash out difficult interpretative questions that
arise under the general language of the Code in other contexts,
such as attorney discipline cases, it seems entirely appropriate to
sharpen the delineation of an attorney's duties for civil liability
purposes and to limit the permissible range of interpretative ex-
pert testimony.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO EXTENSIVE USE OF THE
CODE IN PRIVATE LITIGATION
While common sense and theoretical justifications strongly
impel generous use of the Code in civil litigation, several objec-
tions that have not yet been addressed might be marshalled
against it. These objections relate to concerns, generally, about
undue harrassment of attorneys, about inappropriate interference
with the disciplinary process, and about overprotection of attor-
ney interests. These objections taken together are not of sufficient
weight to cause rejection of the basic argument, but do serve to
provide some important limitations on the underlying notion.
The first objection that might be raised against permitting
every allegation of an attorney violation of the Code to survive a
motion to dismiss in a subsequent damage action against that
attorney is that this would result in unneeded litigation against
attorneys. The objection could take several forms. One, the weak-
est, is a floodgates argument that, although attorney violations
of the Code are widespread and cause substantial injury, "9 courts,
because they are already overloaded with more meritorious litiga-
tion, should not be employed for policing lawyer misconduct out-
side the established attorney discipline procedures. This version
of the floodgates argument is readily refutable. In comparison
with the volume of litigation that courts have permitted to beset
other professionals such as physicians, no one can assert that
lawyers are less worthy objects of civil litigation or that their
clients and others alleging harm produced by attorney violations
of the Code are less worthy petitioners for civil redress. If, on the
other hand, attorney violations of the Code are minimal, then one
may be comforted that the ordinary procedures for ferreting out
specious claims should suffice to protect attorneys and courts
59. See Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 904, 136 Cal. Rptr.
321, 328 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
19791
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against a flood of cases.
Another form of the unneeded litigation argument focuses on
the realities of the practice of law, particularly in heatedly con-
tested cases. It asserts the likelihood that specious tort actions
alleging breach of the Code would be employed maliciously by
opposing counsel in an attempt to hobble the defendant-attorney
in his or her representation of the opposing party." The objection
is a serious one, if well founded; but one may wonder whether the
predicted abuse of the legal process would actually be wide-
spread. After all, DR 7-102(A)(1) already condemns the filing of
an action merely to harass or maliciously injure another. 6 The
normal interest of trial courts in keeping the litigation process
uncluttered with ill-founded collateral disputes that spin off main
actions"2 can be trusted to keep such diversions to a minimum.
Moreover, in many communities the collegial instincts of most
attorneys not to burden a brother or sister attorney with specious
personal claims can be relied upon to restrain many groundless
claimsA3
Concern that the threat of civil liability not be employed in
a widespread way to harass attorneys unduly can also be guarded
against by limiting these actions, at least in instances that are not
60. Cf. Harmatz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 511, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ("If every
time a lawyer is annoyed or disturbed by the unethical conduct of his opponent he may
bring a lawsuit for damages against his opponent, the courts of this country would be
unable to handle the flood of litigation that would ensue."). Presumably the force of the
objection would extend to suits by the represented party as well, since it would be a
relatively simple matter in most instances for an attorney to encourage the client to permit
the use of the client's name as the plaintiff against the opposing attorney.
61. In re Sullivan, 283 Ala. 514, 219 So. 2d 346 (1969); In re Hoover, 46 Ariz. 24, 46
P.2d 647 (1935); Snyder v. State Bar of California, 18 Cal. 3d 286, 555 P.2d 1104, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 864 (1976); Meagher v. Kavli, 356 Minn. 54, 97 N.W.2d 370 (1959); In re Malloy,
248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976). Attorneys have also been assessed costs by courts for institut-
ing harassing litigation, see Chesa Int'l, Ltd. v. Fashion Assoc., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411 (W.D. La. 1977); Harrell
v. Joffrion, 73 F.R.D. 267 (W.D. La. 1976); Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
62. This judicial interest is expressed in numerous doctrines making it difficult to
sustain an action that charges the defendant with abuse of judicial process. The civil
remedies for malicious prosecution and abuse of process are hedged about with strict
procedural and substantive requirements that make these remedies unavailable to all
but rare litigants. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, supra note 24, § 4.11 at 343-44; W.
PRossEu, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (4th ed. 1971); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1246 (1969). Libel and slander actions arising out of
testimony or other statements in litigation are almost universally unsuccessful because of
an absolute immunity afforded to participants in litigation. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra, § 5.22; W. PROSSER, supra, § 114.
63. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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actionable on a general damages basis under otherwise applicable
law, to instances in which specific injury is pleaded and proved. 4
Thus, unspecific claims for mental distress and the like would
not be allowed to proceed. In suits for nondamages relief, the
customary equitable requirements of demonstration of the in-
adequacy of legal remedies65 and the threat of future continua-
tion of the offending conduct" could be employed to screen the
meaningful from the petty. As long as these requirements can be
met, however, the sheer prospect of litigation seems no reason to
provide attorneys with special protection against the imposition
of private law sanctions for violations of mandatory professional
norms.
A second objection to viewing attorney violations of the Code
as occasions for the imposition of civil liability is based on a fear
that in the practical realm dissonance would exist between the
actual operations of the disciplinary and private law enforcement
systems. Specifically, this expansive view of the consequences of
Code violations arguably could cause attorney disciplinary bodies
to avoid finding a violation for fear that in a future damage action
the finding could be employed in a way that would substantially
affect the financial interests of lawyers. This would come about
presumably through operation of the doctrine of issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel)."7 Under issue preclusion, the fact of a viola-
tion would be established conclusively by the administrative
finding and the attorney would be prevented in the subsequent
suit from relitigating whether the violation had occurred. Hence,
only issues of causation and quantum of damages would remain
for resolution."
64. Compare, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 98 U.S. 1042 (1978) (recovery under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 limited to special damages; mental pain and suffering are not compensable). See also
Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977) (no recovery of mental
suffering damages in legal malpractice action in absence of bad faith).
65. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.5 (1st ed. 1973).
66. Id. § 2.10.
67. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977). The traditional terminology for the doctrine that prevented relitigation of discrete
issues that had already been adjudicated was "collateral estoppel." That phrase is reced-
ing in favor of the more descriptive "issue preclusion." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 532 (2d ed. 1977).
68. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, at § 68.1. In many jurisdictions, how-
ever, issue preclusion would not prevent the attorney from litigating the question of
whether or not a Code violation had occurred because of the absence of "mutuality," that
is, the party opposing the attorney in the private suit was not a party to the attorney
disciplinary proceeding. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 67, at 77-78, 580.
A fair number of jurisdictions reject the mutuality requirement, however, at least in some
common situations. See id. 578-80.
1979]
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Research has not revealed any reported case directly address-
ing the question whether a finding of a lawyer disciplinary agency
is preclusive in subsequent civil litigation. 9 Under a rationale
that at one time gained acceptance in one federal court, preclu-
sion might be denied on the ground that a right of jury trial in
the subsequent civil litigation would be unduly compromised by
giving preclusive effect to the prior administrative disciplinary
proceeding in which no jury played a part.70 Aside from this,
however, there seems little reason to deny preclusion because of
any perceived defect in the adjudicatory process that leads to
discipline.7 Special procedural protections are commonly af-
forded to accused attorneys in professional disciplinary proceed-
ings.712 In subsequent civil litigation these protections normally
should afford courts full confidence that the findings of the disci-
plinary agency were the product of a full and fair hearing on the
issue."
69. Cf. Howell v. Thomas, 566 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1978) (attorney's contempt convic-
tion not collaterally estopped because of subsequent favorable jury verdict in disbarment
proceeding); Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority, 433 F.2d 665, 671 (2d Cir. 1970)
(dicta) (no collateral attack in federal civil rights action on adverse finding by state
employee disciplinary agency); In re Estate of Gould, 547 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. App. 1977) (a
prior disbarment decision of the state's supreme court, in which an attorney was found to
have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility in numerous respects in the adminis-
tration of an estate, creates collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation by beneficiaries of
the estate to deny the attorney any fee because of his wrongdoing).
The statement in H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 37 (1953), that res judicata does not apply
to disciplinary proceedings should not be taken broadly. In the only authority cited, In re
Bruener, 178 Wash. 165, 34 P.2d 437 (1934), the court simply held that its original disbar-
ment order does not preclude a disciplinary agency's consideration of subsequent circum-
stances and conduct when the disbarred attorney presents it with a petition for reinstate-
ment.
70. See Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
Rachal has been denounced by some academic commentators. See e.g., Shapiro and
Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Commenf on Rachal v. Hill, 85
HARv. L. REv. 442 (1971). Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunctions in Subsequent Private
Damage Actions, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 1329 (1971). For a tentative rejoinder, see Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 648 n.33
(1973). The Supreme Court has recently rejected the Rachal jury trial argument against
collateral estoppel. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979).
71. A generally recognized exception to the normal application of the rules of collat-
eral estoppel applies when the first adjudication of the factual issue occurred under.cir-
cumstances in which the person against whom the fact was found was handicapped in
adjudicating the issue. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1, Com-
ment j (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
72. Most jurisdictions require that the disciplinary prosecutor prove the violation by
clear and convincing evidence and that the disciplinary hearing agency accord the accused
attorney full procedural protections such as counsel, cross-examination, discovery, and
subpoena powers. See generally, ABA DISCIPLINE STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 62-68.
73. Courts generally have not hesitated to give collateral estoppel effect to adminis-
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Such an issue preclusion effect would, however, strengthen
the objection that civil-suit utilization of the Code to measure
attorney responsibility may discourage bar disciplinary agencies
from dealing expeditiously and fully with attorney defaults.
There could then be a real fear that threatened or pending civil
litigation may cause the professional disciplinary panel to fail to
find a violation when the facts warrant it." Or the disciplinary
body may be reluctant to proceed with its determination if it felt
it would be unduly burdensome for the attorney to be required
to defend before two different tribunals" for the same alleged
offending conduct.-"
These concerns are not inconsequential. If the prospect of
future issue preclusion would seriously deter disciplinary pro-
ceedings, then one might well fear that a more explicit judicial
acceptance of provisions of the Code as measures of civil liability
trative agency determinations as long as the precluded party had an opportunity to liti-
gate the disputed matter in a way similar to that provided by litigation before a court.
See generally, United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); H.L. Robertson & Assoc., Inc. v.
Plumbers Local No. 519, 429 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1970) (agency determination creates
preclusion in subsequent private damage action).
74. An underlying assumption is that attorney disciplinary panels traditionally have
been reluctant to visit even discipline, much less civil liability, on fellow or sister attor-
neys, particularly in instances that could be regarded as private disputes between the
attorney and client. See ABA SPEC LL COMMITrEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DIScIPIaNARY ENFORCEMENT 97-100 (1970).
75. Indeed, for this and related reasons the Clark Committee recommended that
courts adopt a general policy of deferring disciplinary proceedings until pending civil (or
criminal) litigation against the attorney is determined. See ABA SPECIAL COMMrI'rEE ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 73, at 82-85. Some states have
formally adopted the recommendation. E.g., Wyo. S. CT. DiSCIPLINARY CODE, RULE VIII
(Supp. 1977). But at least one state has rejected the suggestion when only a civil case is
pending against the attorney. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 240 S.E.2d 668, 674
(W. Va. 1978). In an analogous area, courts have shown some disposition not to attempt
to resolve in disciplinary proceedings doubtful legal issues that are the subject of a pending
civil suit between the attorney's client and another person. Se, e.g., In re Dineen, 380 A.2d
603, 605 (Me. 1977).
76. While these objections may not suffice to make the Code irrelevant in private
litigation, they may serve as persuasive arguments for a unitary approach to the sanctions
of discipline and restitution. Indeed, in some instances courts have combined discipline
and private relief and have ordered attorneys to make restitution to clients in disciplinary
cases. See, e.g., In re Marine, 82 Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976). See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d
307 (1977). The Model Code of Disciplinary Procedure, promulgated for possible adoption
by local federal courts, provides that an attorney aisbarred from federal court for defalca-
tion of a client's funds must take steps to make restitution as a condition to reinstatement.
See 64 A.B.A.J. 25, 27 (1978). See also ABA DIScIPLINE STANDARDS, supra note 18, at §
6.12.
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would be counter productive. Considerations exist, however,
that militate against accepting these concerns as persuasive rea-
sons for ignoring the provisions of the lawyers' Code in civil litiga-
tion. First, there are reasons to believe that the sanction of civil
damage recovery may be a more, or at least equally, effective
mode of deterring attorneys from violations of the Code than
disciplinary proceedings have proved to be.7 Code enforcement
through civil litigation could, therefore, usefully be expanded
even at the cost of some decrease in enforcement through attorney
disciplinary actions. Second, it is by no means clear that the.
perceived dampening effect will occur. For example, attorney dis-
ciplinary agencies would probably hesitate to proceed only in
cases in which the applicability of the Code is seriously in doubt
or the injury to the complaining party or to the public is perceived
to be slight.7
In the end, courts will be required to speculate on the relative
costs and benefits of these varying approaches to encouraging
attorney compliance with the Code and the likelihood of serious
impingement upon the disciplinary process from expansion of the
role of civil suits. My judgment is that substantial expansion of
civil-suit utilization of the Code could occur without impairing
the present effectiveness of the attorney disciplinary system in
most states.
A third objection to use of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility in the way proposed is that the Code may be too biased in
favor of the interests of lawyers and thus may inadequately pro-
tect the interests of nonlawyers participating in civil litigation
against lawyers. Many critics have charged79 that the Code is
actually overly protective of the interests of lawyers at the ex-
pense of clients or others who may be disadvantaged by this
overprotectiveness.
Generally, one might attempt to introduce a provision of the
Code into litigation concerning a lawyer's civil liability for one of
two different reasons - either to demonstrate that the attorney's
conduct fell short of that professional requirement or, by the
defendant-lawyer, to demonstrate that the conduct in issue met
77. See text accompanying notes 34-52 supra.
78. At another extreme, rare instances may arise in which a private suit litigant
attempts to obtain an issue preclusion advantage in the civil suit for damages by means
of influence on a bar disciplinary agency. But courts and the agencies themselves may be
relied upon to frustrate attempts to employ the disciplinary machinery corruptly.
79. See the authorities collected at note 6 supra.
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an acceptable level of performance as authoritatively defined.
The two instances entail different problems.
When a plaintiff relies on the Code to demonstrate that a
defendant-attorney's conduct is actionable, courts have little rea-
son to resist the effort. As developed above,"0 the plaintiff's at-
tempt is similar to instances in which claimants in other areas
have been permitted to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct
departed from an articulated and generally accepted standard, as
with a criminal statute, business regulation, or custom or habit
within a group.
In any case in which the Code of Professional Responsibility
is put forward by an attorney to defend an action taken in the
attorney's former representation of a client, however, the court
should carefully analyze the Code provision before employing it
as the measure of the attorney's responsibilities. The principal
source of concern is the process by which the Code and its amend-
ments usually come into existence. The process, from the genera-
tion of suggested wording to the final adoption of Code language
in local jurisdictions, is currently controlled almost exclusively by
lawyers." As a result, one must entertain at least an initial con-
cern that the wording of the Code might have been inserted by
lawyers for self protection or for similar narrow reasons rather
than as the result of a proper, or at least disinterested, assessment
of the perhaps competing needs of lawyer, client, and public. The
situation is analogous to instances in which industries were at one
time permitted in some courts to set their own tort standards by
the device of promulgating loose work rules. 2 The dominant view
in courts today, however, is that no industry-established standard
of care is conclusive against the claims of outsiders for a higher
standard. 3
80. See text, section m supra.
81. See Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, supra note 7, at 634-36 (1978).
82. E.g., Shadford v. Ann Arbor St. Ry., 111 Mich. 390, 69 N.W. 661 (1897); Kilbride
v. Carbon Dioxide and Magnesia Co., 201 Pa. 552, 51 A. 347 (1902).
Courts have occasionally refused to be bound to a standard of care accepted by a
profession, as in cases in which medical procedures that were accepted as elective by
physicians have been permitted to be imposed as mandatory through tort recoveries. E.g.,
Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), criticized in King, In Search of a
Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The !'Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND.
L. Ray. 1213, 1250 (1975). The Washington legislature subsequently reversed the Helling
rule. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (West Supp. 1977).
83. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 24, § 17.3 at 977-79; James &
Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REV. 697,
710 (1952); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. Ray. 1147, 1153-54 (1942).
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Thus, while an attorney should be permitted to offer proof
that his or her challenged conduct conformed to the requirements
of the Code, the plaintiff usually should not be precluded from
offering proof and arguing to the factfinder that custom, habit,
sound policy, or common sense requires a standard more protec-
tive of the interests of clients or other persons. In some cases,
however, the plaintiff's argument may so far trench upon Code
values that are clearly based upon broad public interests that the
argument should be precluded as a matter of law.
A case in point is the California Supreme Court's recent
decision in Kirsch v. Duryea.84 The defendant-attorney had repre-
sented the client in a medical malpractice action that was facing
a mandatory trial date. The attorney determined that trial of the
client's claim was not justified by the facts. Upon the client's
insistence that the case nonetheless be tried, the attorney in-
formed the client that substitute counsel should be found so that
the attorney could withdraw. After a period of time during which
the client obtained no substitute counsel, the attorney withdrew
from the case, two months short of the mandatory last date for
trial. The client's action was subsequently dismissed for lack of
prosecution. At the ensuing legal malpractice trial an attorney
was permitted to testify for the client that a prudent attorney
should immediately withdraw without the client's consent upon
determining that a case is without merit. Reversing a judgment
against the defendant-attorney, the California Supreme Court
held that this testimony should not have been allowed because
the course of action it proposed would have violated the Califor-
nia Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Code."'
The Kirsch decision is clearly a correct assessment of the
relative interests of lawyers, clients, and the public. The relevant
rules permit an attorney to withdraw from a case only after taking
"reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of
his client."" The testimony offered on behalf of the client at the
legal malpractice trial, if accepted, effectively imposed on the
attorney a duty to withdraw without regard to consequences such
84. 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, (1978); cf. Chicago Title Ins. Co.
v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177, 182 (N.C. App. 1978) (malpractice plaintiff cannot rely solely on
allegation of defendant-attorney's conflict of interests; he must also allege attorney's
inability to represent conflicting interests and failure to obtain consent of all clients, for
otherwise DR 5.105(C) would permit representation of conflicting interests).
85. 21 Cal. 3d at 311, 578 P.2d at 940, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
86. CAL. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2-111(A)(2); ABA CODE DR 2-110(A)(2) (both
provisions are identical in wording).
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as impairment of the client's ability to settle because of the sig-
nals that would be transmitted to the opposing party by a non-
consensual withdrawal.87 Thus, solid reasons unrelated to the at-
torney's self-interest support the rule that justified the attorney's
action, and the California court quite reasonably permitted the
attorney to defend his conduct (as a matter of law) by resort to
it. Had the court concluded otherwise, finding that nothing sup-
ported a rule of delayed withdrawal other than attorney self-
interest, it presumably would have permitted argument against
the reasonableness of the rule or, indeed, may have refused to
permit the attorney to justify his conduct by reliance on the rule.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE USAGES OF THE CODE
The theoretical justification for the general use of the Code
in civil litigation, if persuasive, might lead one to assume that
courts have actually employed the Code extensively in this fash-
ion. Yet, at least as measured by reported decisions, the Code
seems to remain a largely unexploited resource. 8 In part its rela-
tive underutilization in civil cases may reflect its very high level
of generality in expressing its concepts. In part, however, this
state of affairs may reflect a failure on the part of courts and
lawyers to thresh the Code of Professional Responsibility care-
fully to glean from it the worth that it can claim. In the following
pages I will illustrate ways in which courts have employed the
Code creatively - or have inexplicably passed up opportunities
to do so - in malpractice and similar kinds of private liability
litigation in which attorneys have been parties.
87. 21 Cal. 3d at 311, 578 P.2d at 940, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 223. A case similar to Kirsch,
although not cited in it, is Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406
(1968). The court in that case rejected the notion that it should impose on attorneys an
absolute duty to withdraw from a representation upon the discovery of a conflict of inter-
ests. The court cited the Canons for the proposition that, as long as the attorney has made
full disclosure and obtained the full consent of the client, the attorney may proceed
despite the conflict. While the Lysick court's resolution would seem on the surface to
protect attorneys by permitting them to proceed with lucrative representations despite a
conflict, it can also readily be defended on a broader, public interest ground permitting
the fully informed client to consent to the representation in order to avoid the additional
costs of obtaining substitute counsel. Cf. Morgan, The Emerging Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HRV. L. Rav. 702 (1977) (conflict of interest rules are in attorneys' self
interest because they create need for involvement of more attorneys in a matter).
88. A useful recent listing of Code provisions that have been involved in legal mal-
practice litigation may be found in R. MAuEN & V. Lavrr, supra note 46, at 629-30.
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A. Conflicts of Interests
A potentially important area in which the Code could be
employed to define the civil liability of attorneys is that of con-
flicts of interest, both in situations in which an attorney has
represented two or more clients with conflicting interests89 and
those in which the attorney's own interests have conflicted with
those of the client.
90
1. Dual Representation. -Consider first the problem pre-
sented by simultaneous representation of clients with conflicting
interests. Illustrative is the leading California case of Ishmael v.
Millington.' The defendant-attorney had for some years repre-
sented a man in his business dealings. The man arranged for the
attorney to represent him and his wife in a divorce action. It was
agreed that she would file the divorce action as plaintiff and that
it would be uncontested. The attorney drew up a property settle-
ment agreement based on materials that the husband supplied
him. The wife signed the agreement, relying on her husband's
false representations that it fairly represented a fifty-fifty division
of their common property. The attorney met the wife for the first
time at the courthouse, where he escorted her through a perfunc-
tory ex parte divorce action that resulted in judicial approval of
the property settlement. The wife thereafter discovered that she
would receive only $8,807 for surrendering her rights to com-
munity assets worth ten times that much. She sued the attorney
for malpractice, alleging that he had negligently permitted her to
be duped by her husband.
The California court held that the complaint stated an ac-
tionable claim.2 It rejected the attorney's argument that the ac-
tion should be barred by the wife's admission that she had not
89. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Ishmael v.
Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v.
Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 252 N.W.2d
107 (Minn. 1977); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969); see Wooddy v. Mudd, 258 Md. 234,
240-44, 265 A.2d 458, 464-66 (1970). The client must, of course, allege injury as a result of
the attorney's impermissible joint representation. See Brosie v. Stockton, 105 Ariz. 574,
468 P.2d 933 (1970). Occasionally the Code's rules on conflict of interests have been
successfully employed in defending a damage suit. See Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d
230 (Fla. App. 1977) (because Code would not permit attorney to represent both buyer
and seller of real estate, in the absence of explicit misrepresentations buyer's attorney
could not have been misled into thinking that attorney was protecting his interests).
90. See text accompanying notes 101-13 infra.
91. 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
92. Id. at 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
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relied on the attorney for advice.93 Explicitly invoking the Califor-
nia Code of Professional Conduct and the ABA Canons of Eth-
ics," the court held that an attorney attempting to represent brth
parties in a divorce action is under an affirmative duty to make
a full disclosure to both parties of the conflicting interests be-
tween them,95 to advise them of the desirability of separate coun-
sel," and, if the dual representation is nonetheless accepted, to
take affirmative steps to protect the interests of both parties."
Holdings such as that in Ishmael make an important contri-
bution to what would otherwise be the state of the law. Under
general negligence doctrine, the definition of the standard of care
of the attorney in Ishmael would have been established at trial
by reference to general concepts of reasonableness. 8 In the ab-
sence of the authoritative delineation of an attorney's responsibil-
ities contained in the lawyers' Code, it presumably would have
been permissible for the defendant-attorney to have introduced
expert testimony that the normally careful attorney in California
would have proceeded as he did.9 In effect, then, the court's
explicit reliance on the lawyers' Code delineated the attorney's
tort duties in a way that precluded application of a lesser stan-
dard. 00
2. Attorney's Business Dealings with a Client.-A variant
on the conflict of interest problem is presented whcn an attorney
enters into business transactions with a client. It is universally
recognized that an attorney, both during the attorney-client rela-
tionship and for a period of time after it ends, is governed by a
fiduciary-like standard in business dealings with a client.0 1 The
attorney's responsibilities in this respect are broadly analogous to
the fiduciary duties that attach to trustees under an express
93. Id. at 530, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
94. Id. at 526-28 nn. 2-4, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97 nn. 2-4. The court, at footnote 3,
seemingly rejected a less burdensome provision of the then California Rules of Professional
Conduct in favor of ABA Canon 6, which required "full disclosure of the facts" before dual
represerltation could be undertaken.
95. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 526-28, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
96. Id. at 526 n.3, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 596 n.3.
97. Id. at 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
98. E.g., Estate of Kruger, 130 Cal. 621, 626, 63 P. 31, 33 (1900); Moser v. Western
Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 200 P.2d 7, 10 (1948).
99. E.g., Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 368 F. Supp. 418, 422 (iO.D. Pa. 1973), affl'd.
507 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1975).
100. For a more detailed discussion of conflict of interest problems in divorce actions,
see Crystal, Ethical Problems in Marital Practice, 30 S.C.L. Rav. 321, 325-338 (1979).
101. E.g., Delano v. Kitch, 542 F.2d 550 (10th Cir. 1976); People v. Schermerhorn,
567 P.2d 799 (Colo. 1977); Sherman v. Klopfer, 32 111. App. 3d 519, 336 N.E.2d 219 (1975).
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trust,' officers of a corporation," 3 and partners.' The most fre-
quent application of this duty for attorneys takes the form of
awards of rescission, damages, or other relief to a former client
because the attorney has gained an unfair advantage in a busi-
ness dealing with the client0 5 or has taken personal advantage of
a business opportunity that by right should have been for the
benefit of the client.
10
In private litigation against attorneys courts generally have
accorded full sweep to the Code requirements severely restricting
business dealings with a client.' Occasionally, however, one en-
counters instances in which courts may have been insufficiently
attentive to the Code's relevance in resolving disputes in non-
disciplinary litigation. A case in point is Ruth v. Crane. '0 A fed-
eral district court in Ruth granted an attorney specific perform-
ance of his client's contract to convey land to him at a favorable
price. The court, after determining that the contract was "fair
and reasonable in light of the fact that one of the purchasers was
the defendant's attorney,"'' stated that it was not passing upon
whether there had been a violation of the Code, but referred the
matter to the state's disciplinary agency for further proceed-
ings."10 From intimations in the opinion it appears that the court
may have been concerned that the attorney might not have com-
102. E.g., Miller v. Craig, 27 Ariz. App. 789, 558 P.2d 984 (1977); Main v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 31, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 385 (1977).
103. E.g., Katz Corp. v. T.H. Canty & Co., 168 Conn. 201, 362 A.2d 975 (1975);
Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 240 N.W.2d 507 (1976).
104. E.g., Skone v. Quanco Farms, 261 Cal. App. 2d 273, 68 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1968); Few
v. Few, 239 S.C. 321, 122 S.E.2d 829 (1961).
105. E.g., Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1977); Goldman
v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. App. 1975); Colstad v. Levine, 243 Minn. 279, 67 N.W.2d
648 (1954); Flanagan v. DeLapp, 533 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1976). Taking unfair advantage of
a client in a business transaction is also, of course, a ground for the imposition of profes-
sional discipline. E.g., In re Geyler, 114 Ariz. 321, 560 P.2d 1228 (1977); In re May, 96
Idaho 858, 538 P.2d 787 (1975); In re Belser, 269 S.C. 682, 239 S.E.2d 492 (1977).
106. Healy v. Gray, 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918); Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217
Minn. 536, 15 N.W.2d 174 (1944) (permissible representation, however, when full disclo-
sure is made); In re Hurd, 69 N.J. 316, 354 A.2d 78 (1976) (use of information of potential
benefit to client to enrich attorney's close relative); cf. Alexander v. Russo, 1 Kan. App.
2d 546, 571 P.2d 350 (1977) (attorney's urging client to tell police whereabouts of stolen
property with motive of claiming award was conflict of interest violation and precluded
attorney from recovering award).
107. DR 5-104. See, e.g., Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512,
(1977); Sherman v. Klopfer, 32 Ill. App. 519, 336 N.E.2d 219 (1975); Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc.,
388 A.2d 103 (Me. 1978).
108. 392 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
109. Id. at 731.
110. Id. at 731, 732.
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plied with the requirement of DR 5-104(A) that he make a full
disclosure to the client before entering into a business deal with
the client.' If this is a fair reading of Ruth, then the court in
effect has held that the attorney is under no legally enforceable
duty to comply with the disclosure requirements. Yet it would
seem that performance of this professionally mandated duty is
important to the presumptively less informed client,"2 and, on
the facts of the case,113 might have had an important causative
influence on the client's willingness to sell at an unfavorable
price. Under such circumstances there seems little reason to
hesitate to enforce the full disclosure duties of the Code in the
civil litigation itself.
B. Client Confidences and Secrets
Another area of potential significance concerns the obligation
of the attorney not to disclose confidential information about the
client. In some cases, breach of this obligation has led to an award
of damages."' For example, an attorney who revealed to the tax-
ing authorities that his client had not paid taxes was held to have
violated his fiduciary obligation to the client; this violation war-
ranted relief in a private action between the parties." 5 Often dis-
111. The attorney had disclosed that he and his law partner, together with other
investors, would be the purchasers of the property and had stated that his feelings would
not be hurt if the client retained separate counsel, 392 F. Supp. at 728. This would seem
to fall substantially short of the "full disclosure" requirements frequently mentioned in
the cases: a full explanation of the disadvantages of doing business with one's own attor-
ney and advice to the client of the desirability of retaining separate counsel. See, e.g.,
Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1977); Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc.,
388 A.2d 103 (Me. 1978).
112. The chief danger presented by attorney-client business dealings is that the client
will not receive the same kind of advice to protect his or her interests as would be received
if the other party to the transaction were a stranger to the attorney. Because of this, many
courts have created a presumption of undue influence in such instances of attorney-client
business dealings. E.g., Reeder v. Lund, 213 Iowa 300, 236 N.W. 40 (1931); Meara v.
Hewitt, 455 Pa. 132, 314 A.2d 263 (1974).
113. The defendant-attorney's expert witness testified that the fair market value of
the property was $95,000. The plaintiff-client's expert put the value at $211,000. The
contract price was $85,000. 392 F. Supp. at 729-30. It seems unlikely that independent
counsel would not have attempted more vigorously to obtain competing offers. See id. at
727 (attorney contacted only someone with whom he shared an office, who in turn found
investors). The defendant-attorney knew from a client disclosure that she was anxious to
sell because of financial reverses that had made it difficult to meet the mortgage payments
on the property. Id.
114. See authorities collected in R. MALLEN & V. LEvTr, supra note 46, at 135-36.
See altso the leading English case of Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 235, 132 Engl. Rep.
401 (Common Pleas 1836).
115. Sherman v. Klopfer, 32 Ill. App. 3d 519, 336 N.E.2d 219 (1975). Apparently the
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closure of such information would violate the attorney-client priv-
ilege protected by statute or court rule in most jurisdictions.
The protection of clients afforded by the Disciplinary Rules
of the Code goes much further than the statutory privileges, how-
ever. It includes, in addition, most knowledge about the client
that the attorney may possess, even if the matter is not protected
against disclosure by the testimonial privilege. ' 6 Thus, an uncon-
sented attorney disclosure of any "secrets" of a client may be
equally actionable. For example, if an attorney reveals in a book
information about a client that was not subject to the attorney-
client privilege but did come within the "secrets" definition of
DR 4-101(A), one could make a persuasive argument that the
client should have a recovery of profits or other damages against
the attorney."7 Another possible application of this ground of
liability might arise in situations in which an attorney, without
the informed consent of a client, invests in publicly traded shares
of a corporation because of "secret" information obtained in the
representation. Perhaps only in situations in which the purchase
works to the disadvantage of the client (tipping off, for example,
a client's planned takeover of the corporation), but perhaps in all
instances, courts may hold that the attorney's unauthorized use
of the secret for the attorney's own advantage creates a right of
action in the client.
1 1
court relied upon its finding of breach of fiduciary obligation through the report to the
Internal Revenue Service to validate the client's cessation of payments otherwise due the
attorney as well as to support an award of other relief relating to a complicated business
arrangement into which the client and attorney had entered. Id.
116. The Code defines as a "secret"-and thus subject to strict rules against disclo-
sure-"other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has re-
quested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client." DR 4-101(A). These non-disclosable "secrets"
include many matters that would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege. For
example, information learned from a person other than the client or informaion learned
from the client but not in a confidential setting would also be protected from unconsented
disclosure. See DR 4-101(B)(1).
117. This does not address, of course, possible constitutional and other defenses that
the attorney could assert if the client, for example, is a public figure. The attorney could
not, however, ordinarily defend a suit for damages relying on a contract with the client
permitting publication rights to the attorney. Such contracts are outlawed by DR 5-104(B)
if entered into prior to the end of the representation.
118. See DR 4-101(B): "[A] lawyer shall not knowingly. . . (3) Use a confidence or
secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client
consents after full disclosure."
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C. Communication With Adverse Party
Murmurings can be found in some cases of possible attorney
liability for damages for breach of the duty of DR 7-104(A)(1),
which forbids direct or indirect communication with a party rep-
resented by counsel without the consent of that other counsel"51
A clear case calling for a literal application of the Code prohibi-
tion against contact with a represented party is an instance in
which a disadvantageous settlement is negotiated with the oppos-
ing party without the knowledge of the opposing party's attor-
ney. 1
20
Courts have been reluctant in these cases, however, to give
relief to the client who has entered into the unadvised settle-
ment. 121 The normal rationale has been that in the absence of
fraud or similar deception the parties were free to enter into an
arms' length settlement.2 2 While such concepts may reflect an
acceptable accommodation of conflicting policies in litigation
between the settling client and the offending attorney's client,
there is no reason to extend the same rationale to the offending
attorney. The attorney, unlike the client, clearly functions under
special strictures imposed by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Thus, the opposing party who has entered into an improvi-
dent settlement because of the attorney's unconsented contact
with that party in the absence of counsel should be permitted to
recover from the offending attorney damages measured by the
119. Harmatz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 511, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dicta)
(client, but not attorney in the absence of an allegation of special damages, may be able
to recover); cf. Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1973) (no recovery on theory of intrusion into attorney-client relationship, but possible
recovery-although of narrower scope-for "unreasonably intrusive" breach of privacy in
view of alleged fact that contact was surreptitious and occurred in client's hospital room).
120. Courts in similar instances have permitted the attorney for the settling party to
recover damages against the offending party (at least when it is an insurance company),
measured by the difference in size between the fee that the attorney received from the
settling client and the fee that would have been received in a well-counseled settlement.
E.g.. Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1976); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 107 Ariz. 498, 489 P.2d 837 (1971); Skelly v. Richman, 10 Cal. App. 3d
844, 89 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1970); cf. Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 403 F. Supp. 986 (M.D.
Tenn. 1975) (similar theory of recovery, but less generous measure of damages). Courts
have also permitted the non-consenting attorney to enforce a charging lien against the
party who caused the uncounseled settlement to be made. E.g., Siciliano v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 745, 133 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1976); Downs v. Hodge, 413 S.W.2d
519 (Mo. App. 1967).
121. E.g., Raabe v. Universe Tankerships, 263 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
122. Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1976); Raabe v. Universe Tanker-
ships, 263 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 403 F. Supp.
986 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (recovery permitted where fraud shown).
1979]
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difference between the settlement figure and the amount that
would have been forthcoming in a counseled negotiation.
D. Prosecution of Frivolous Litigation
Several courts in recent years have dealt with cases in which
physicians have attempted to recover damages against the attor-
ney who had filed an unsuccessful medical malpractice action on
behalf of a client against the physician.' While several theories
of recovery have been advanced and rejected in these cases,' 24 at
least some of the opinions suggest that a theory of an implied
right of recovery because of an attorney's violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility may be viable.'12 In any event, the
courts' treatment to date of this Code theory permits considera-
tion of the manner in which the courts have treated private recov-
ery claims based on violations of the Code in general. Discussion
may be particularly appropriate because litigation of the liability
question has only arisen in recent years and the question is un-
settled in many jurisdictions.
The Code provision that attorneys in these cases are alleged
to have violated is DR 7-102(A)(1), which states that an attorney
shall not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay
a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another."' 26 The plaintiffs' theory in
123. See generally Mallen & Roberts, The Liability of a Litigation Attorney to a Party
Opponent, 14 WILLAMSrr L.J. 387 (1978); Comment, Attorney Liability for Malicious
Prosecution and Legal Malpractice: Do They Overlap?, 8 PAc. L.J. 897 (1977); Annot., 84
A,L.R.3d 555 (1978).
124. A simple negligence theory of recovery has sometimes been rejected because of
the absence of privity between the injured party and the attorney. E.g., Bickel v. Mackie,
447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-82 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902,906-07 (Iowa
1978). The theory of malicious prosecution of civil action has been difficult to employ
against attorneys because of the rule, followed in many jurisdictions, that the plaintiff
must demonstrate some special injury beyond those commonly associated with defending
litigation. See Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 381
N.E.2d 1367, 1373 (II. App. 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d at 904-05 (Iowa 1978);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 518 n.3, 569 P.2d 561, 564 n.3 (1977); Moiel v. Sandlin,
571 S.W.2d 567, 570-71 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). The plaintiff is also precluded from com-
mencing the malicious prosecution action until after successful termination of the original
action in the plaintiff's favor. E.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.3d 379,
92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971); Gasis v. Schwartz, 80 Mich. App. 600, 264 N.W.2d 76 (1978).
125. See authorities collected at note 128 infra.
126. See also Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (DR 6-
I01(A)(2) on handling a legal matter"without preparation adequate in the circumstan-
ces" and FED. R. Civ. P. 11 on attorney's certificate that there is good ground to support
complaint filed); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 600 (La. App. 1976) (ABA CANONS
310 [Vol. 30
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these suits against the opposing attorney is that the attorney's
violation of the Disciplinary Rule and the plaintiffs consequent
reputational and other injuries should be sufficient to demon-
strate liability. The reception given this theory by the courts has
been mixed, with some rejecting the theory outright and appar-
ently without qualification,'" although one major court has
stated that in a stronger case it would be prepared to entertain
such a claim.s
The principal argument of the courts that have rejected the
Code theory outright is that recognition of it would offend a pub-
lic policy favoring free resort to the courts.12 This policy, which
also finds expression in restrictive doctrines limiting malicious
prosecution and abuse of process recoveries, attempts to assure
all litigants a virtually absolute immunity from subsequent dam-
age actions even when they present groundless disputes to a court
for resolution.' 30 The policy also protects the attorney for the
oF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 30 (1908), the predecessor to DR 7-102(A)(1), in effect at the
time of the medical malpractice suit); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 522-23, 569 P.2d
561, 566 (1977) (state statutory provisions similar in import to Disciplinary Rules on
frivolous claims).
127. See Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56
Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978);
Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
128. O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977) (per Linde, J.); accord,
Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 925, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 24 (1975) (dicta) (attorney
may be held liable for malicious prosecution by client's adversary when attorney prose-
cutes "a claim which a reasonable lawyer would not regard as tenable or by unreasonably
neglecting to investigate the facts and law in making his determination to proceed
. ... ); Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 684, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 291, 297 (1975) (dicta); cf. Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. App. 1978)
(no sufficient pleading of malicious prosecution case against attorney on facts here, but
no mention of general immunity of attorneys from such suits); Cooper v. Public Fin. Corp.,
246 S.E.2d 684, 689-90 (Ga. App. 1978) (no liability for breach of DR 7-102 for lack of
showing by plaintiff that law was clearly adverse to attorney for opposing party at time
of the original litigation). Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1372, 1376 (Ill. App. 1978),
affirms that an attorney may be liable for damages for malicious prosecution of an action
in behalf of a client and holds that DR 7-102(A)(1) merely covers the same ground as
malicious prosecution. In Friedman v. Dorzorc, 268 N.W.2d 673 (Mich. App. 1978), the
court rejected a negligence theory based on DR 7-102(A), but held that a cause of action
against the attorneys for malicious prosecution of a civil action had been adequately
pleaded. The court did suggest that the "probable cause" issue in malicious prosecution
might be informed by the Code provisions on zealous advocacy. See id. at 679.
129. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976);
see Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Il. App. 1978); Friedman v. Dorzorc, 268
N.W.2d 673, 675 (Mich. App. 1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 519, 569 P.2d 561,
564-65 (1977) ("freedom of resort" as rationale in support of "special injury" rule in
malicious prosecution suit by physician against attorney).
130. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF Toms § 120, at 851 (4th ed. 1971).
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plaintiff because without the assistance of an attorney the plain-
tiff would be hard put to take advantage of the dispute-resolving
machinery of the judicial system.' 1
The difficulty with the "free resort" argument as applied to
the attorney who knowingly prosecutes a frivolous case is that this
precise chilling effect is the intended, or at least the accepted,
effect of DR 7-102(A) (1). Attorneys have been subjected to formal
sanctions by attorney disciplinary agencies for frivolous or harass-
ing litigation.' 3 And other sanctions, such as the imposition of
court costs or the obligation to pay the prevailing party's attorney
fees,'3 1 have been imposed upon attorneys in similar circumstan-
ces. As in instances in which courts have permitted injured par-
ties to assert claims founded upon criminal or regulatory statutes
that the defendant is alleged to have violated, the recognition of
a Code theory of recovery for frivolous litigation would simply
acknowledge that the provision of sanctions such as professional
discipline does not adequately respond to the need of the injured
party for compensation.' 34 It would also recognize the legitimate
131. The court's additional rationale in Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 601 (La.
App. 1976), that upon discovering the weakness of the client's case the plaintiff's attorney
owes no duty to the physician being sued because former Canon 30 makes withdrawal from
representation only permissive, not mandatory in such circumstances, would presumably
not obtain under the present DR 2-110(B)(1). In effect, DR 2-110(B)(1) now makes with-
drawal mandatory in situations in which DR 7-102(A)(1) applies.
132. E.g., In re Wetzel, 118 Ariz. 33, 574 P.2d 826 (1978); Snyder v. State Bar, 18
Cal. 3d 286, 555 P.2d 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976). To be sure, there may be differences
in the relative threats posed by a private litigant suing the opposing attorney for damages
as opposed to the prosecutor for the attorney disciplinary agency prosecuting the attorney
who has filed the frivolous suit. The disciplinary agency prosecutor will invariably be
another attorney and thus might appreciate better the unpredictability of clients and the
legal process and will not have been embroiled with the charged attorney in the previous
litigation. Arguably, these differences mean that the attorney disciplinary process for the
enforcement of DR 7-102(A)(1) presents much less of a chilling effect than would a suit
against the attorney for damages. But the same cannot be said of the various party-
initiated sanctions for frivolous litigation that are employed by courts. See note 133 infra.
133. See, e.g., Acevedox v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.
1976); Chesa Int'l, Ltd. v. Fashion Assoc., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977); Harrell v. Joffrion, 73 F.R.D. 267 (W.D. La.), affl'd, 545 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (reprimand and personal assessment of court costs against
medical malpractice plaintiff's attorney for pursuit of "totally frivolous" suit). See
generally Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial
Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619 (1977).
134. A similar response seems to dispose adequately of the argument that the Code
provisions on frivolous litigation do not expressly create a private cause of.action in favor
of a party injured by such litigation. See Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D.
Iowa 1978). It is almost never the case that express provisions or civil recovery are
mentioned in criminal and regulatory statutes that often have been adopted by courts as
the measure of conduct in private damage actions. See text accompanying notes 22-28
supra.
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place of the action for damages in the scheme of enforcement and
deterrence machinery to obtain compliance with the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. '35
Some courts appear disposed to favor adoption of a Code
theory of recovery in frivolous litigations cases. The Oregon Su-
preme Court in O'Toole v. Franklin'36 seemed prepared to ac-
knowledge the existence of an attorney's tort of "pursuit of an
action known to be wrongful and unjust.' 37 But the court found
that the theory had not been pleaded in the case; the suing physi-
cian had relied totally on theories of malicious prosecution and
negligence. If such a cause of action were acknowledged to exist,
it would, of course, be entirely consistent and appropriate to ins-
ist that the plaintiff have had the previous vexatious litigation
terminated favorably as a precondition to suit.' 3 But, with this
qualification and the further condition that the plaintiff demon-
strate some specific reputational, financial, or personal harm,"
'
3"
it would seem entirely consistent with a policy of encouraging free
resort to the courts to impose liability upon an attorney for know-
ingly 7 1 participating in the prosecution of an utterly groundless
135. See text accompanying notes 34-52 supra.
136. 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977).
137. Id. at 523, 569 P.2d at 566. The court analogized the right of action under the
attorney's Code to the Supreme Court's creation of a private right of action from the duty
expressed in the Securities Exchange Act in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976). See 279 Or. at 523, 569 P.2d at 566-67.
138. See Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978) (failure to plead
successful outcome of malpractice suit would bar suit based on theory of violation of DR
7-102(A) (1), even if court were disposed to recognize it). Compare Babb v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971) (requirement of successful termination
as predicate to malicious prosecution suit by physician against attorney).
139. The personal harm could include intentional infliction of emotional distress
under aggravated circumstances, at least in jurisdictions that recognize this as a general
tort. See Kinnamon v. Staiman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977)
(cause of action stated for intentional infliction of emotional distress by violation of
lawyers' Code prohibition against threat of criminal prosecution a means of obtaining
advantage in civil litigation); Jones v. Nissenbaum, Rudolph & Seidner, 368 A.2d 770,
774-75 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (dissenting opinion) (violation of DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2)
as basis of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
140. The court in O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 523, 569 P.2d 561, 566 (1977),
would apparently limit the tort to an attorney's "pursuit of an action known to be wrongful
and unjust." Id. (emphasis in original). This suggests that the court would not recognize
a right to recover in instances in which the groundlessness of the case was unknown
because of the attorney's negligent failure to know the facts or applicable law. See also
Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (Ill. App. 1978). In this respect the right of
recovery might be narrower than the conduct apparently prohibited by DR 7-102(A)(1),
which may extend as well to situations in which "it is obvious" that the suit is intended
by the client merely to harass or maliciously injure another. Compare Friedman v. Dor-
zorc, 268 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Mich. App. 1978) (successful pleading of malicious prosecution
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suit with foreseeable harm resulting. In outline, the cause of ac-
tion would very closely resemble the action for malicious prosecu-
tion of a civil action recognized in some states as the civil side
cognate to the traditional action for malicious prosecution of a
criminal case.' 4' An important difference, which I would urge
upon courts that have acknowledged the malicious prosecution
claim against an attorney but have rejected the Code theory,4 2 is
that the courts should examine the Code more closely for guid-
ance that it might afford in determining such questions as
whether the attorney lacked probable cause for prosecuting the
original action.'
E. Litigation Over Fees
A sometimes litigated' area of attorney-client dispute is
over the size of the fee charged by the attorney. While it is gener-
ally accepted that the size of the fee is subject to contractual,
arms-length negotiation between the parties,' 5 courts have al-
ways shown a willingness to intervene in the bargaining process
action against attorney on allegation that attorney had no "probable cause to proceed with
the suit initially or to continue it thereafter.").
141. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Ammerman v.
Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. App. 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 fI. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d
685 (1978); Friedman v, Dorzorc, 268 N.W.2d 673 (Mich. App. 1978); Moiel v. Sandlin,
571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
142. E.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (Ill. App. 1978); Friedman v. Dorzorc,
268 N.W.2d 673, 674-75, 677-79 (Mich. App. 1978); cf. Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567,
571 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (rejection of cause of action based on violation of criminal statute
against barratry).
143. Cf. Friedman v. Dorzorc, 268 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Mich. App. 1978) (use of ABA
CoDE, EC 7-1 and DR 7-101(A)(1), to determine standards for taking a client's case).
144. EC 2.23 provides that a lawyer "should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary
to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client." Lawyers have been disciplined for
burdensome fee litigations with clients. See, e.g., In re Wetzel, 118 Ariz. 33, 574 P.2d 826
(1978).
145. See, e.g, Baron v. Sarlot, 47 Cal. App. 3d 304, 120 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1975); Potter
v. Daily, 220 Ind. 43, 40 N.E.2d 339 (1942); Burns v. Valene, 298 Minn. 257, 214 N.W.2d
686 (1974); Higgins v. Beaty, 242 N.C. 479, 88 S.E.2d 80 (1955). Most courts, however,
will scrutinize more strictly a fee arrangement that is made or altered after the parties
have entered into the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Knapp v. McFarland, 457
F.2d 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974); Archer v. Griffith, 390
S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964). Contra, e.g., Renegar v. Staples, 388 P.2d 867 (Okla. 1963) (client
has burden of proving unreasonableness of post-relationship fee agreement by clear and
convincing evidence). In the absence of an express agreement on fees, courts will apply
familiar rules of quantum meruit to determine the reasonable value of the legal services
actually rendered. E.g., Dailey v. Testone, 72 Wash. 2d 662, 435 P.2d 24 (1967); In re
Marine, 82 Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978).
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in favor of the client when the client demonstrates'46 that the
bargained-for fee is unreasonable.'"
Occasionally, courts find support for such an intrusion into
the private world of contracting in the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. The Code directs that a lawyer should not charge a
"clearly excessive" fee.'48 Under DR 2-106(B) this occurs when "a
lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee."'49 Employ-
ing this standard, courts have refused to enforce fee contracts
that have been determined to be unreasonable.'5 ° The common
remedy has been to award the attorney a recovery of only a rea-
sonable fee regardless of the parties' prior agreement for a greater
146. On occasion, when a client raises a substantial question about the reasonable-
ness of the attorney's fee, courts have placed the burden of proof of reasonableness on the
attorney. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Knowlton, 305 Minn. 201, 232 N.W.2d 789
(1975) (court will closely scrutinize fees that seem to be more than ordinarily charged);
Herro, McAndrews & Porter v. Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 214 N.W.2d 401 (1974).
147. See, e.g., Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1978); Magana v. Platzer
Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Handleman v. Keehn, 4 [19771 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Wade v. Clemmons, 84 Misc. 2d 822, 377
N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Harmon v. Pugh, 248 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. App. 1978). See
generally, Project Note, Recent Developments in Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685,
710-18 (1976) (recent litigation concerning court-imposed maximum contingent fee sched-
ules). In addition to reduction of fees in litigation with clients, an attorney may be sub-
jected to formal discipline for charging an unreasonable fee. E.g., In re Rappaport, 558
F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977); Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975); In re Kuzman,
335 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Ind. 1975); Westchester County Bar Ass'n v. St. John, 43 App. Div.
2d 218, 350 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1974); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Moss, 577 P.2d 1317 (Okla. 1978);
In re Clarkson, 244 S.E.2d 512 (S.C. 1978). Occasionally courts find that relief for the
client and discipline for the attorney require restitution of an unreasonable fee to the client
as a condition of reinstatement to practice after a period of disbarment. E.g., In re Han-
sen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1978).
148. DR 2-106(A).
149. The phrase "lawyer of ordinary prudence" in DR 2-106(B) apparently refers to
the normal judicial practice of admitting expert testimony by lawyers concerning the
reasonableness of the fee charged. See generally City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d
448, 472 (2d Cir. 1974); Ruwitch v. First National Bank, 327 So. 2d 833 (Fla. App. 1976);
Parish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Iowa 1978); Jones v. Bryant, 283 So. 2d 307, 310
(La. App. 1973); In re Estate of Coffin, 7 Wash. App. 256, 267, 499 P.2d 223, 229 (1972).
The statement in the Disciplinary Rule does have the unfortunate possible connotation
that only lawyers are suited to be judges of the reasonableness of fees. This meaning, of
course, ignores the fact that in many circumstances the final question of reasonableness
will be submitted to a jury of nonlawyers as a question of fact. See, e.g., Carlson, Collins,
Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal. App. 2d 212, 233, 64 Cal. Rptr. 915, 920 (1967);
Taylor v. Barnhill, 470 P.2d 902, 905 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Perkins v. Blake, 332 N.E.2d
396, 399 (Mass. App. 1975). The statement in DR 2-106(B) that unreasonableness is to
be tested on a "definite and firm conviction" standard may be quite different from the
normal statement of the burden of proof in nondisciplinary actions. See note 140 supra.
150. See authorities cited in note 147 supra.
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sum." ' In particularly aggravated cases the court may refuse to
award any fee despite the completion of substantial work by the
attorney.' 52 When fees are awarded, courts have frequently looked
to the Code' 5 for a delineation of the factors to be taken into
account in determining whether a fee is reasonable. 54 Private
litigation clearly reflects the significant role the Code plays in
regulating this most important economic relationship between
attorneys and clients.
Room remains, however, for further growth in the law-under
the stimulus of the Code even as presently drafted. A prominent
candidate for change in the law is the doctrine that has been
applied by some courts that in a suit by an indemnitee against
an indemnitor for a contractually promised payment of attorney
fees, the court will not inquire into the reasonableness of the
charge for fees. A common illustration is when the parties to a
note have agreed to a specific (and often very high) figure for
attorneys' fees if the holder of the note must bring suit for collec-
tion. Some courts, but not all,'15 take the position that the
amount of the attorneys' fee is a matter of private contract and
the court will not re-examine it absent an allegation of fraud,
151. E.g., Wade v. Clemmons, 84 Misc. 2d 822, 377 N.Y.S.2d 415, (Sup. Ct. 1975);
Herro, McAndrews & Porter v. Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 214 N.W.2d 401, 404 (1974).
152. Courts have threatened a complete refusal of fees in cases in which the attorney
pressing the fee claim has allegedly committed a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Canons of Ethics, as by representing conflicting interests, De Korwin
v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 F. Supp. 302, 306-07 (N.D. Ill. 1957); American-Canadian Oil &
Drilling Corp. v. Aldridge & Stroud, Inc., 237 Ark. 407, 373 S.W.2d 148 (1963); Rolfstad,
Winkjer, Suess, McKennelt & Kaiser v. Hanson, 221 N.W.2d 734, 737 (N.D. 1974); In re
Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1978), by abandoning the client's case without good
cause, Borup v. National Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 808, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Schwartz
v. Jones, 58 Misc. 2d 998, 999, 297 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1969), or by misconduct
in the administration of fiduciary funds, In re Estate of Gould, 547 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. App.
1977). The resulting forfeiture by the attorney of any fee, even a reasonable one consider-
ing the actual value of the services performed, is similar to the result reached in other
instances in which a fiduciary in the course of providing valuable services commits a
serious breach of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPOPATIONS § 2145 (Rev. Perm. Ed. 1976); RsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
469, Comment e (1957).
153. See DR 2-106(B).
154. E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1974); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1067-68 (D.D.C. 1976); Kay v. Cascade
Packing Co., 19 Wash. App. 579, 585, 576 P.2d 929, 933 (1978); Herro, McAndrews &
Porter v. Gerhardt, 62 Wisc. 2d 179, 184, 214 N.W.2d 401, 404 (1974).
155. E.g., Waterman v. Sullivan, 156 Colo. 195, 397 P.2d 739 (1964); Coley v. Coley,
94 S.C. 383, 77 S.E. 49 (1913); Richardson v. Breeding, 167 Va. 30, 187 S.E. 454 (1936);
National Bank v. Myers, 75 Wash. 2d 287, 450 P.2d 477 (1969).
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duress, illegality, or the like. ' The result is unfortunate and
could lead to absurd consequences. If the attorney actually is the
recipient of an unreasonably high fee, he or she is needlessly
enriched at the expense of the notemaker. The premium repre-
sented by the unreasonably high fee often cannot be defended as
an in terrorem device to prevent defaults on notes, because usury
laws and similar regulations already prohibit forfeiture penalties
in these transactions. If the attorney is not paid anything more
than a reasonable fee, then the lender is permitted to recover
more than the outstanding value of the note, with similar need-
less enrichment at the expense of the maker. In either event the
exaction from the maker is taken because of an unreasonably high
fee - a result that does little to stimulate public confidence in
the setting of attorneys' fees. 15 A better approach would be to
limit the amount of the recovery for attorneys' fees to a reasona-
ble sum in every case. So long as the measure of a "reasonable"
fee permits the lender to be assured of quality legal representa-
tion in the collection action, imposing the Code measure of rea-
sonability on the transaction would seem preferable. This would
prevent needless enrichment of attorneys or lenders and may as-
sist to increase public confidence in the price of legal representa-
tion.
F. Fee Splitting
An area in which the regulatory norms of the Code are clear
is that of fee splitting among lawyers.' 58 According to DR 2-
156. See Mortgage Investors v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 278 Md. 505, 366 A.2d 47
(1976) (particularly note the dissent, 366 A.2d at 51).
157. A recent study prepared for the National Center for State Courts indicated that
the public may view high legal fees as a very serious problem affecting the judicial system.
YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF COURTS: HIGHLIGHTS OF A NA-
TIONAL SURVEY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, JUDGES, LAWYERS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS 28, 38
(1978).
158. See, e.g., Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg, 77 Cal. App. 3d 60, 65 n.1, 143 Cal. Rptr.
389, 391 n.1 (1978) (public policy behind prohibition against fee splitting precludes for-
warding attorney's negligence action against second attorneys who allegedly failed to file
action within limitation period); In re Diamond, 72 N.J. 139, 368 A.2d 353 (1976) (disci-
pline case); Schroeder v. Schaefer, 258 Or. 444, 477 P.2d 720 (1970) (forwarding attorneys
could not recover under fee contract with clients for failure to inform clients of their
interest in fee sharing arrangement with firm in another state to which clients knew they
were forwarding case); Fleming v. Campbell, 537 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (fee
splitting contract among lawyers is void and unenforceable because of Code prohibition).
The broad sweep of the prohibition against fee splitting in the Code has been criti-
cized on the ground that it discourages an attorney from releasing a case to another
attorney who may be much more competent in the matter. See THE -RoscoE
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107(A)(1), a lawyer may divide a fee with another lawyer who is
not a partner or associate " ' only after full disclosure to the client
and free client consent. Even with consent, the total fee must be
reasonable'6 and its division must be made in proportion to the
services actually performed by both attorneys. "'
Assume a case in which attorneys secretly split a fee in viola-
tion of the rule. The "forwarding" attorney receives a one-third
share of the fee without performing significant legal work. The
total fee is otherwise reasonable. May the client in a later suit
recover the unearned portion of the fee retained by the forwarding
attorney? No court seems to have ruled directly on the issue.1
2
Should the client be prevented from recovering because of the
assumed reasonability of the total fee - and, hence, the client's
lack of proximate injury from the attorney's violation of the Disci-
plinary Rule?
Courts, influenced by the policy goals of the Code, should
permit recovery in such a case. First, giving a damage recovery
to the client may tend to enforce better a rule that is probably
widely violated."3 Second, most, clients would have considerable
difficulty overcoming the assumption that the fee is "reasonable"
in size. Under present law clients have considerable difficulty
showing that any fee is unreasonable. The factors that are said
to be relevant in a consideration of the reasonableness of a fee are
so many and so indeterminate'64 that even very high fees can be
POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, ETHICS AND ADVOCACY 17 (1978); Morgan,
The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 H~Av. L. Rav. 702, 741-42 (1977);
Stokey, Personal Viewpoint: Let's Re-examine Fee Splitting, 61 A.B.A.J. 1253 (1975).
159. DR 2.107(A); Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wash. App. 304, 556 P.2d 233 (1976) (attor-
ney hired to cover for attorney taking fourteen-month leave of absence from sole practice
could permissibly split fees with attorney on leave).
160. DR 2-107(A)(3).
161. DR 2.107(A)(2). See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.
1977); Palmer v. Breyfogle, 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975).
162. State v. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d 797, 523 P.2d 872 (1974), comes close. A divided
court in that case affirmed a jury verdict against governmental clients in a case rather
similar to the problem posed in the text. The majority did not explicitly rule on the
existence of a right of recovery, but expressed doubt that recovery could be had by the
client in the absence of proof of damages. Damages, the court intimated, might be absent
when the total fee was reasonable. Id. at 843, 523 P.2d at 899-900.
163. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: W o's IN CHARGE? 99-100 (1974); Hall
& Levy, Intra.Attorney Fee Sharing Arrangements, 11 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 25 (1976); Note,
Division of Fees Between Attorneys, 3 J. LEG. PROF. 179, 188-92 (1978).
164. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is '.Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 281, 2&5-87 (1977).
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defended as "reasonable."'' 5 The client therefore should not be
required to show that the total split fee was excessive before being
able to recover the forwarding attorney's share of the fee. More-
over, if the attorneys had been as fully candid about the fee as
they should have been, the client would have been in a position
to bargain or shop for a lower fee.'66
CONCLUSION
As the preceding sections have attempted to demonstrate,
misalignments exist between the scope of an attorney's responsi-
bilities under the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
attorney's more limited liability under private law. The judicial
expansion of attorney liability proposed in this article is hardly
gratuitous, but is impelled by both strong theoretical considera-
tions and the vital practical goal of enhancing enforcement of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. To date, the judicial re-
sponse to opportunities for this kind of enhanced enforcement of
the Code has been, frankly, too grudging. And the Code itself
could be made much more explicit in defining and in some in-
stances making more rigorous the responsibilities of the attorney
in several areas that may result in civil litigation. The potential
use of more specific standards in civil litigation will doubtless
create pressures against their adoption because of the narrow,
pocketbook concerns of attorneys. But it is believed that pres-
sures from the public and from within the legal profession for
higher standards, better articulated and more effectively en-
forced, may well prevail.
165. In any event, in the common instance of splitting a one-third contingent fee, the
total fee might be unassailably reasonable in size.
166. See Schroeder v. Schaefer, 258 Or. 444, 477 P.2d 720 (1970).
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